In this scene, Velleius the Epicurean is criticizing the speculations of Balbus the Platonist and Lucilius, who represents the Stoics. He asks them if the Demiurge of Plato made the world, or the Providence of the Stoics, why these deities delayed so long? What occupied them for the infinity of time before the world was framed?
“Moreover I would put to both of you the question, why did these deities suddenly awake into activity as world-builders after countless ages of slumber? …. it is inconceivable that there was ever a time when time did not exist. Well then, Balbus, what I ask is, why did your Providence remain idle all through that extent of time of which you speak? Was it in order to avoid fatigue?
“But god cannot know fatigue; and also there was no fatigue in question, since all the elements, sky, fire, earth and sea, were obedient to the divine will. Also, why should god take a fancy to decorate the firmament with figures and illuminations, like an aedile? If it was to embellish his own abode, then it seems that he had previously been dwelling for an infinite time in a dark and gloomy hovel!
“And are we to suppose that thenceforward the varied beauties which we see adorning earth and sky have afforded him pleasure? How can a god take pleasure in things this sort? And if he did, he could not have dispensed with it so long.”
Christians also speculate what their God was doing during the infinity of time before creation. Was He dwelling in the dark before He said the words 'Fiat Lux'? Boethius, I think , would give a more coherent if less imaginable answer: God dwells in eternity, and from the point of view of eternity, the creation and the Last Judgment are simultaneous events. To ask what He did 'before' He created time is like asking where the author of Lord of the Rings dwelt before he created Hobbiton in the Third Age. Did Tolkien live in the Second Age? Where was Tolkien before the Valar sang the two trees into being? “But god cannot know fatigue; and also there was no fatigue in question, since all the elements, sky, fire, earth and sea, were obedient to the divine will. Also, why should god take a fancy to decorate the firmament with figures and illuminations, like an aedile? If it was to embellish his own abode, then it seems that he had previously been dwelling for an infinite time in a dark and gloomy hovel!
“And are we to suppose that thenceforward the varied beauties which we see adorning earth and sky have afforded him pleasure? How can a god take pleasure in things this sort? And if he did, he could not have dispensed with it so long.”
(Of course, some wags answer this way: 'What was God during during the infinite time before creation? Preparing Hell to receive those who dare ask such questions!' Wit makes for neither good philosophy nor good theology, I fear. I am reminded of Keynes famous quip that there is no point in considering the long run detriments of Keynesian economics, because in the long run we are all dead. Wit is makes for not good economics either.)
I think it amusing, if not instructive, to see a relationship between this antique dispute and the speculations of modern astronomers over the implications of Big Bang theory.
If timespace came into being with the moment of the Singularity (to give the Big Bang a more dignified name), then what was the condition of the universe (if there was a universe) before this point? Was it the collapse of a previous universe that, in some almost Hinduistic endless cycle, was somehow the same as our current universe? Was it a nothingness? If there was no time, how could there have been an event, such as the event, whatever it was, which gave rise to the first instant of the universe? If the Singularity was the first cause of all events in the universe, what caused the first cause?
Stephen Hawkings asks us to imagine the universe as a four-dimensional plane through which a four-dimensional sphere is passing. The first moment of contact between this hypersphere and hyperplane is the Singularity: as the sphere intersects the plane, the dot becomes a small circle becomes a larger circle, which represents our timespace continuum suffering Hubble expansion.
For Hawkings, there is no such thing as before the Big Bang because timespace is represented by the expanding circle. One cannot speak of one second before the Big Bang any more than one can speak of one inch to further north of the North Pole.
The paradoxes of a cause of the first cause still exist in Hawking’s image, merely at one remove. If the hypersphere is drifting through the unimaginable medium of inter-cosmic nonbeing, what set it in motion? If there is such a thing as the state of being closer and farther from the hyperplane it eventually intersects, then there is something like time, or some sort of sequence of events. Where did this hyper-objects come from and how were they set in motion?
It answers nothing to say that these events proceed from no cause, because to assert that something comes from nothing undermines not merely science, but reason itself.
(However, let me suggest that a distinction can be made between Boethius' answer and Hawkings, because Boethius has a metaphysical underpinning to his answer that Hawkings lacks. Hawkings cannot explain how a natural event arose from a condition of pre-universe non-being-ness where nature had no laws because it did not exist. For a natural universe to arise from a non-natural pre-universe by a natural and mechanical process of physics is a paradox. The law that 'Nothing Comes from Nothing' cannot arise from nothing. For Boethius, however, a Necessary Being can perform an intelligent and deliberate act of will to create a universe where cause and effect can rule, without itself being bound by mechanical causation. The Creator of a universe can write into the foundations of that universe that 'Nothing Comes from Nothing' without Himself being bound by that law. There is no paradox to postulate a Supreme Being with the ability to create ex nihilo a large arena of timespace in which nothing can be created ex nihilo. To use an analogy, Susan Calvin of US Robots and Mechanical Men does not herself need to be bound by Asimov's Three Laws of Robotics.)
My only point here is that the inquiries as to what Providence did before creation, or what the Big Bang did before it Banged were contemplated by serious men in times long past, and no doubt will be contemplated by men equally serious in times to come.
Those who venture into these deepest and murkiest areas of thought are forewarned that the mysteries are not likely to be resolved by simple answers. Simply to assume that one side or the other has not thought rationally about the argument would be a simple answer.
I am also tickled to see that the character and personality of the Epicureans has not changed over the millennium. Velleius is described as speaking 'In a confident manner' as if afraid of nothing except the possibility that he might seem to have doubts about anything. An odd position for a skeptic to be in, whose whole approach should assume a willingness to doubt everything, but those of you who have debated zealous skeptics in the past will recognize the personality type.
It is the way I spoke when I was an atheist, it is the way a healthy majority of atheists speak now: I remember reading with shocked disbelief in an afterward to his brilliant but flawed book BLINDSIGHT the skilled Peter Watts dismissing with an airy wave of the hand, the concept of free will, which he describes as 'silly' -- as if the phenomena of the universe and man's place in it were so clear and obvious as to admit of no other interpretation save a mechanical one.
Then I smiled in recognition, because I realized Mr. Watts figuratively was the reincarnation of an old friend: he was Velleius. Quantum physics is uncertain whether cause and effect even exists at all on the subatomic level, but Velleius is certain (with a vast and Jovial certainty that scoffs at any opposition) that the opinions and belief-structure of the human brain is a robotic mechanism whose every nuance is controlled by purely Newtonian mechanical causes.
Wow. If I found out that I was an Asimovian robot, and that some cosmic version of US Robotics and Mechanical Men had been programming my positronic brain so that I could not think certain thoughts or cold not act on them, the first think I would doubt was the accuracy of that instrument, my brain, which the Asimovian laws were influencing. H.G. Wells shares this skepticism of the instrument.
October 20 2008, 16:31:05 UTC 3 years ago
Vellieus' argument is flawed...
Suppose time has no beginning. Then there must be, by necessity, infinite moments prior to the present. However, in order for the present to exist, all of these previous moments must have already passed in orderly succession, one right after the other. This is impossible, because infinity is not traversable.In other words, the present moment is like a step on a staircase. In order to get to it, we must first climb each step below. However, if there are infinite steps below the present moment, then we will never finish climbing them, and thus we will never arrive at the present moment. But we are indeed, right now, at the present moment. Thus, the staircase must not extend backwards into infinity.
Therefore, time has a beginning. There is no other alternative.
Velleius says, "...it is inconceivable that there was ever a time when time did not exist." On the contrary, it is inconceivable that time has always existed.
On the other hand, time can indeed be infinite, but it must stretch into infinity on the side of the future, not on the side of the past. No matter how many steps we take along an infinite staircase that has a beginning, we will still be a finite distance from the first step. Thus, the present moment would always exist.
October 20 2008, 16:48:06 UTC 3 years ago
Re: Vellieus' argument is flawed...
I am not sure that necessarily shoots down Velleius' argument.If I were to say that negative numbers have no conceivable 'number of which no lower number can be conceived' I run into no paradox. For let any number, no matter how many digits, be expressed X. The number to the left of it on the number line is X -1.
By analogy, if the origin point, 0, is our present, and positive numbers are our future, I see no reason to suppose that negative numbers might not be our past, and by without a boundary.
Imagine HG Well's Time Traveler in his famous machine, running backward. No matter what the year is, 5 Trillion BC or whatever, he can always twist his levers and recede back one more year, 5 Trillion and 1 BC.
The earlier causes do have to exist to lead to current effects, but the earlier causes, even if they took infinite time to lead to the current effect, if they have an infinite time to do this in, could have accomplished this by now.
So it is conceivable. Modern astronomy tells us that this conception might not be the case.
Other conceptions are possible. If Hinduism is correct, our Time Traveler is trapped in a infinite but boundaried timespace: receding back to 15 Billion BC turns out to land him in the far future.
Ancient Stoics argued that the universe must be infinite in extend. Their argument was similar to the one given here: suppose there to be a brink or end to the cosmos. Walk to it and take a spear. Fling the spear over the end. What does it hit? Whatever it hits, it must hit something, and that thing is a member of the sum total of all things, which is to say, within the universe. An unimaginable modern concept of a cosmos curved in the fourth dimension can escape this Stoic paradox.
October 20 2008, 17:24:26 UTC 3 years ago
Re: Vellieus' argument is flawed...
The number line analogy you provided is faulty. In order to arrive at 0, we do not have to pass through each negative number first. Numbers are concepts, and are not bound by time.Moreover, you have inadvertently introduced a beginning or origin of time into your argument: the present moment. Now you have two future directions. Except, your origin is moving with each passing moment, which again introduces the problem I pointed out in the first place.
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October 29 2008, 03:07:46 UTC 3 years ago
Re: Vellieus' argument is flawed...
To torture your analogy...What then if that present moment is a stairstep on a one way Escher Moebius staircase? The current step would be the present, and there would be an infinate number of stairs before you and after you. Yet, even the "same" step you reach again, is not the same present as the previous present as you are traveling in a single direction. Hence, there is an infinity on both sides and time has always existed.
???
October 20 2008, 20:36:17 UTC 3 years ago
An unusual simularity
If, as Hawking says, the universe is a hypersphere where the current universe is defined by a hypercircle (sphere) with a hyperplane, then from the right perspective, both poles of the hypersphere exist at the same time. Almost as if"the creation and the Last Judgment are simultaneous events".
October 21 2008, 17:26:07 UTC 3 years ago
Re: An unusual simularity
What was meant was that God, from the perspective of Eternity, effectively experiences all events as simultaneous -- not just those.October 21 2008, 00:34:46 UTC 3 years ago
the joker's answer
from St. Augustine's Confessions
He then goes into explanation of what God did before He created the heavens and the earth.
October 21 2008, 01:36:48 UTC 3 years ago
and in the Latin here: http://www.corpusthomisticum.org/ocm.ht
Basically, while Thomas accepts on faith that the world had a beginning in time, he considers whether the world could also have been eternal, and whether this would constitute a contradiction. Somewhere, I recollect, he also considered and rejected the objection that was raised above, about an infinite succession of past moments (I think Anselm raised it, but IIRC).
To say that something was made from nothing is not to say that a nothing existed prior in time to the something. If "nothing" existed, then it was something. But also when we say that "Mary is sad about nothing," there is no sense that first there was a nothing and then Mary was sad about it.
Also, suppose a foot is planted in the dust, and both the foot and the dust have always existed. Beneath the foot is a footprint, which has also always existed. Yet we have no trouble regarding the foot as the cause of the footprint, even if it was not prior to the footprint in time.
October 21 2008, 03:01:25 UTC 3 years ago
Hey Francis, maybe you can answer my question below too, namely-- how is causality even possible outside of time?
October 21 2008, 19:25:55 UTC 3 years ago
October 21 2008, 02:47:42 UTC 3 years ago
A few questions
Mr. Wright, you said:"Boethius, I think , would give a more coherent if less imaginable answer: God dwells in eternity, and from the point of view of eternity, the creation and the Last Judgment are simultaneous events."
This argument causes another problem however. If God already knows right now what happens at the Last Judgment, that means he must also know everything that you and I are going to do between now and the last day. But if God already knows all of our actions, how free are those actions? I haven't made all those choices yet, but according to Boethius' argument God already knows every detail of what I'll do tomorrow, and the next day, and so on until I die. How free are my choices if God already knows everything I'll ever do?
You also said, "It answers nothing to say that these events proceed from no cause, because to assert that something comes from nothing undermines not merely science, but reason itself."
But I wonder: how can there be causality outside of time and space? How would that work? The chain of causation is based on the idea that one thing follows another. A fire starts, and a house burns down. But if there was no time, or just a single eternal 'moment', causes and effects would be simultaneous. But that doesn't appear to make much sense. The house can't burn down at the same time that the fire is starting which will burn it down.
October 21 2008, 02:56:58 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
I'm not Mr. Wright, but I'll try to answer your question. The fact that God knows everything does not mean you have no free will. As a small example, I know that when the bell rings, the school will empty of students. I knew that ahead of time, but did not cause it. In your life, have you ever eaten something that was bad for you, and you knew it? I know I have. Knowledge and actions are often separated.As to causality outside of time and space, ever read a book? Everything in the book is finished, done, before you get to read it. But there was still an illusion of cause and effect. It's a clumsy metaphor, but I think it works.
October 21 2008, 03:04:08 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
"Everything in the book is finished, done, before you get to read it. But there was still an illusion of cause and effect."But the book has not existed eternally. It had to be written, printed, and so on. The finished book is just a recording of the sequence of cause and effect by which the author composed it.
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October 21 2008, 03:24:29 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
Also, on the other part of your reply, I understood the meaning differently from you.I didn't imagine God having knowledge of the future as you did of the bell ringing, which is a mere probability. At your school, the bell will *probably* ring as it always does. But it isn't guaranteed. Maybe someone will vandalize the bells. Maybe the power will go out, thus keeping the bells from ringing. Your knowledge of the future is probabilistic, not absolute.
God's knowledge, on the other hand, is supposed to be absolute. If he exists in an eternity outside of time, then all the events of time have already happened and are still happening from God's viewpoint, spanning every moment from creation to the last day.
If, for example, Sen. McCain pulls out a victory on election day and then dies a week after he is sworn into office, God is right now watching Governor Palin get sworn in as President, and knows exactly what kind of clothes she is wearing, what jewelry she has on, as well as what she is thinking and what she will say right before a disgruntled leftist assassinates her. God would also then be currently watching the swearing in of House Speaker Pelosi as the latest president, and so on until the Last Judgment.
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October 21 2008, 04:59:02 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
Unfortunately, while the novel analogy is great for God and time, it's rather poor for suggesting room for contracausal free will.3 years ago
October 21 2008, 03:16:47 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
The cause is prior to the effect in logic, but not necessarily in time. This is difficult for time-bound creatures to grasp, but if the neo-Platonists could do so with the example of the eternal foot planted in the eternal time, we moderns can modestly do the same.A house burning is experiencing motion [change] and therefore is taking place in time and is subject to time. If there is no time, two things cannot happen at the "same" time.
Also, regarding your question about preknowledge and free will, the freedom of the will is a logical conclusion from the existence of the intellect, and it does not matter if someone else knows what I will desire. My wife knows that if crab legs are on the menu I will almost always order them. But her knowledge in no way causes my choice. After all, a free choice need not be an unpredictable one. Remember, the opposite of free is determined, not unpredictable.
October 21 2008, 03:17:44 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
that should have read:...the eternal foot planted in the eternal dust...
October 21 2008, 03:39:52 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
I don't see why I have to accept an argument simply because it was made by the neo-Platonists.How is cause and effect even *possible* outside of time? Using the example of the foot and the footprint is misleading because both are objects inside of time. As well, we are accustomed to seeing footprints inside of time, not to mention feet.
You are trying to use a situation inside of time to prove something about cause and effect outside of time. But the thing in question is whether or not there is any cause and effect outside of time, and why. Simply snatching a normal occurrence in time from our world, freezing it, and saying it is 'eternal' doesn't answer anything to my mind.
As well, about foreknowledge and free will: Wouldn't God know not just your desires, but also your actions in the future? All your actions take place in time, and if God is outside of, and encompasses, all time, then he knows all of your actions since he sees all time.
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October 21 2008, 04:57:51 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
How is your choice of crab legs not determined, e.g. by your preference for crab? Or by your taste for something else, when you choose something else, or by random noise when you order something else, then realize you really wanted crab?3 years ago
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October 21 2008, 21:09:13 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
"But if God already knows all of our actions, how free are those actions?"There is no easy answer to your question, because it is nearly impossible to define such ideas as 'eternity' 'free will' and 'foreknowledge' clearly enough to draw a firm conclusion.
My own thinking is that freedom of the will is a descriptor of acts moved by final causes, that is, when act A is done 'for the sake of' goal G. Any action that can not be understood unless it is described into reference to its goals is a free will action. That definition of free will says nothing about cause and effect or predictability or knowledge or foreknowledge. So, for myself, the way I define the term, I see no paradox or conflict between foreknowledge and free will.
Are we talking about freedom or predictability? Freedom of the will means that the act of willing is not dependent upon, defined by, or controlled by mechanical causes. When used in this way, free will is meant merely to make it clear we are not talking about one billiard ball hitting another.
Suppose I read a history book, where I see that George Washington made the difficult and dangerous decision to cross the Delaware at Christmas and attack the enemy position. From Washington's point of view, his decision is a decision, that is, an act of the will. From my point of view, since I do not occupy the same time as Washington, the decision is over and done with. Does that mean Washington, from my point of view, lacks free will? I hope not: for then there would be no merit to his act.
Suppose Shakespeare writes a play, where Hamlet, after much misgivings and hesitation, decides to commit regicide. From Hamlet's point of view, (if Hamlet can be said to have a point of view) Hamlet has free will. From Shakespeare's point of view, perhaps Hamlet does not -- on the other hand, any novelist will tell you that sometimes characters come to life in your imagination, and seem to do things one cannot control or predict.
The problem is, that no one us know the ontological status of paths not chosen, choices not made. Are the real? Are they merely images that exist in speech? If the choice I did not make is unreal and impossible, that my free will is merely moving down a grove from which the laws of the universe make it impossible for me to deviate. of course, whenever I make a decision, and ponder my options, the alternatives seem real enough to me.
October 21 2008, 21:09:40 UTC 3 years ago
Continued
We walk down the corridor of life, and at every branch there are two doors. We can never know if the door through which we did not walk was merely painted on the wall. Was it possible for us to go through that other door?One answer says that if everything is foreknown by Omniscience, or if everything is fore-ordained by the relentless laws of cause and effect, the doors we did not take are just painted on the wall, not a real place we really end up going. This answer says that the word "possible" means the same thing as "impossible." If the other door is the door you did not take, it was now and aways was impossible that you could have taken it.
My answer is that the word "possible" means just that. At one time it could have been, but now it can no longer be.
On the other hand, if the choice I did not take is as real and solid in an parallel stream of events as real as the road to Bakersfield I did not take, then my choice is entirely my own doing, not hemmed in by the walls of the road.
Common sense suggests that the road not taken does not snap out of being just because I do not take it; likewise choices not made are as real as the choice I did make, except that they did not come to pass.
If an ordinary mortal, say, for example, your wife, sees you come to the two doors, and she knows both your past actions and your present intentions, and you select the door behind which the lady waits rather than the one behind which the tiger crouches, your wife has not sucked away your free will, even though she knew, with mortal knowing at least, what you would do.
The question is slightly different if The Omniscient Being is standing by watching you reach for the door handle. But I do not see why it is logically necessary for you not to have free will if the Being is watching you.
You see, the argument rests on an ambiguity. It is 'possible' in one sense of the word, the ordinary sense, that you would have chosen the Tiger door. But it is 'impossible' in the definitional sense of the word that the Omniscience Being should foreknow your decision and foreknow in error. If the Being cannot be wrong, it is impossible for you to pick a door other than the one He foretell you shall select.
But this is merely a word game, an ambiguity. The Omniscience might also be said to know which of the two possibilities you will decide, and He might know what the possibilities are. That does not make the possibilities suddenly not exist, any more than the door suddenly turns into a painted door.
The topic merits a longer answer, for it is overburdened with philosophical subtleties: but this is the internet, so a bumper sticker answer is all I can deliver.
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October 22 2008, 02:05:29 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
To see someone do something is not to make him do it.October 23 2008, 00:21:52 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
Nicely and concisely said.October 23 2008, 21:38:32 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
Even when you see someone do something before they themselves know they will do it?October 22 2008, 05:37:22 UTC 3 years ago
Re: A few questions
"how can there be causality outside of time and space?"There would be a logical relationship, not a cause and effect relationship. Remember what you learned in school of Aristotle's Unmoved Mover (or, if you have not read Aristotle, go out now and rear up!). The Unmoved Mover is a conceptual or ideal being, not moving or suffering growth or decay, but which, by its perfection, drawing all movements that aim at perfection toward itself, much as the lover is draw to the beloved. This attraction is not a mechanical cause and effect like magnetism; it is a final cause, a thing that establishes a goal or aim to deliberate action.
A concept is not a thing that is bound in time. Think of a concept like Justice. Men will fight and die for justice, and cry out in starvation for it, because they hunger for justice, but justice does not grow from baby justice to old man justice or burn like a housefire or move or do any other thing that can be described in time. Justice is an eternal concept. Only the lies men tell about it have dates on the calendar; they arise and pass away.
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