John C. Wright ([info]johncwright) wrote,
@ 2009-07-02 18:20:00
Previous Entry  Add to memories!  Tell a Friend  Next Entry
The Desires of Individuals are My Highest Value
This post is related tangentially to the last.

A comment left here made the remark that in a “recent discussion I had with an atheist […] he was unable to posit a single non-religious point that was in any way positive, advantageous, or otherwise non-relativist. When I told him to go and die in whatever way seems best to him, he said that he would go kicking and screaming. Had I decided to respond, I would have said that I see no reason why in a relativist system one should do anything with any feeling at all.”

In reply, another commenter opined "You do things with feeling because you have feelings for those things. Eat because you're hungry, love because you love, work because you feel dissatisfied with idleness, or because you need money to eat, learn because you're curious, fight for justice because you're outraged, or because you have an eye for your own rights and safety.”

He continues: “I've never understood why this is so hard to get. You do what you want because it's what you want to do, that's what wants *are*. No, there's no materialist philosophy telling one what to want, ab nihilo. This is not a flaw."

This reply is inadequate. The first comment, in effect, is asking what warrant one has for taking one’s mere feelings and appetites as a given, and the second comment, in effect, is answering with wide-eyed simplicity that one must take one’s feelings and appetites as a given because nothing else is imaginable.

I can only assume man behind the second comment did not really understand the question, or that he means something other than what it sounds like me means. But if it is not a flaw that no materialist philosophy tells one what one should or should not want, this implies that philosophy ought not rank, order, judge, condemn, praise or blame any appetite or feeling. The mere fact that a given appetites exists at all is sufficient warrant and justification to act on it.

Because I do not believe anyone in his right mind could actually mean this, let me argue not with the man, but with the comment.

The comment means one should take one’s mere feelings and appetites as a given, as a standard beyond question, and beyond criticism.

Let me offer ten quick reasons why they most certainly cannot.

First, feelings and appetites have no forethought, and take no long-term consequences into account. When the gambler is deciding whether to bet the rent money on a promising pony, or a married man pondering whether to arrange an assignation with an available paramour, or a drunkard is thirsting for another drink even if it might kill him, or a soldier sees the terror of war and is tempted to flee to safer environs, or a schoolboy is tempted to fib and flatter a bullying professor, or a politician is tempted to spend the tax moneys meant to be a provision against a day of war for some momentary spectacle, parade or monument to amuse the multitude, or a starving farmer is tempted to consume his seedcorn despite that he will have no harvest in years to come, he only indulges his appetites and feelings at the expense of his prudence.

Second, feelings and appetites have no conscience. Not long ago in Scotland there was a surgeon who became known briefly for his willingness to amputate the legs of those few people who desired it for sexual reasons, either personal, or in order to make themselves attractive to that small clientele that found amputees sexually attractive. Only if the surgeon regarded the feelings and appetites of his patients as paramount over their best interest could he bring himself to perform these operations. More than merely prudence is offended here.

Third, and related to the last, feelings and appetites have no sense of decency, no shame, and no judgment. Feelings and appetites must be judged against a standard of what is wholesome, healthy, normal, and right. Obviously if you are a person afflicted with a perversion, sexual or otherwise, you know that frequently the strongest and most persistent feeling in your heart is the one least wholesome.

Arguments that favour abandoning norms of behaviour boil down to two: (1) a mere perverse denial that men can reason out (or learn from a sound authority) what is and is not perverse; or (2) a mere hellish desire to escape the condemning eye of the conscience.

Fourth, conflicts between mutually exclusive appetites cannot be resolved, unless reason stands as the arbiter. This is true both when two jarring appetites war in one man’s breast, and when two jarring appetites drive two men to conflict. Those of you with children know what squalls of tears erupt when the five-year-olds want to play two different games, or each use the same toy, or watch different TV shows. No parent can resolve even these simplest of conflicts without recourse to some sort of objective standard of arbitration, even simple standards such as “He had it first” or “He did his chores” or “It is his turn” or “Learn to share.”

Fifth, feelings and appetites have no sense of honour. If a man insults your wife, or spits on your flag, or tramples the cross of your Savior, your feelings might incline you either to be humble and accept the insult, or to smite the fellow: but honour will dictate when it is proper to yield to insult, and when it is proper to fight. Honour is simply not the same as a feeling of anger. It is a passion that motivates us to avenge an injury even when we are reluctant, or afraid, or for any other reason have no appetite for combat.

Sixth, feelings and appetites have no sense of virtue, no sense of moderation or temperance. When you ask yourself if your appetite is proportionate, the right amount and the right time for this appetite, you can either ask the appetite itself, or ask your sense of moderation and temperance. If you ask of your appetites for food, or sex, or dignities, power, position, money, fame, or ask of your feelings of spite and malice and self-righteousness, or ask of your feeling that you must win at any cost, or ask of your feeling that you cannot look at an issue that offends you with an objective eye, the answer you get from all those feelings is an overwhelming affirmative. All these feelings are zealous and ambitious and selfish. In economic terms, they are always in demand. They can never be finally sated. Don Juan can never have enough lovers; Baron Harkonnen can never have enough food; Edmund Dante cannot have enough vengeance; the Joker just wants to see the world burn. A disordered appetite always presents itself as if it is justified. It always FEELS right.

Seventh, feelings and appetites have no sense of justice. We always judge our emotions to be right, if we consult nothing but our emotions as judge of conduct. One might as well have a jury composed only of the fatuous and doting grandmothers of the accused.

Eighth, feelings and appetites have no patience, no sense of the limits of reality. To use a topical example: His Honor, President Clinton’s appetites no doubt told him that he could perform an unnatural sexual act on a young intern in the Oval Office. The appetite presumably did not offer to him the option of waiting until after a divorce, so that it would be lawful for him to wed and bed the young lady, and waiting until after his term of office was served, so that no shame would be brought upon his name, his party, his office, and his nation, and so that he was no longer a superior exploiting a subordinate. Had he been patient, served his term, divorced his wife, married the girl, and taken her to Niagara Falls, neither his conscience or the world would have noticed or condemned the act, and he would not have been tempted to perjure himself, or tempted to indulge the public’s eagerness to be deceived. Presumably, the limits of reality told him she was beyond his reach. Presumably his sexual appetite, masculine pride, and ambition of power, told him the opposite.

Ninth, feelings and appetites have no sense of logic. Merely because to have one’s cake and eat it too is not possible, does not make the mutually contrary feeling any less full of passion and force. We frequently suffer appetites and feelings for things that are not merely impractical, but logically not possible. The entire political program of socialism, in fact, is nothing but acting out appetites and feelings unrelated to economic reality: a desire for a free lunch. No one doubts the passion and zeal of these enemies of mankind. It is not because of a flaccidness of their appetite for bloodshed, or their greed for the unearned, or their devotion to dishonesty, that one condemns them.

Tenth, feelings and appetites have no sense of reality versus fantasy. I can recall, to use an embarrassing example, infatuations with characters from Japanese anime, or from novels, or role playing games. I have seen people deliver to actors or actresses gushing expressions of emotion which rightly should have been proffered to the character portrayed, and this character was entirely imaginary. We are well aware of irrational, illogical, or unrealistic fears, fears that have no grounding in fact at all, and fears are merely a species of appetite or feeling, an appetite to avoid. If we take seriously the idea that all feelings are a sufficient justification for themselves, this means that a child being afraid of a monster in the closet, or a Leftist panicking over global warming and preparing, like Agamemnon sacrificing Iphigenia, to sacrifice of modern industry to avert the disaster, is perfectly justified, even if the monster is imaginary.

A shallow man feels no need to justify his appetites and feelings. He does not reflect on them: they are merely a given. A profound man rules his appetites and feelings, and distinguishes between justified emotions and unjustified. He is a sceptic: he takes nothing for granted. If someone says “You do what you do, when you want to do it, because you want to do it” and he then wonders what is so hard to understand, he is pretending he does not understand what is obvious. Ironically, he asks why his infinitely shallow doctrine is too deep for us.

Prudence, conscience, decency, reason, honour, virtue, justice, patience, logic, and a respect for reality all militate against that unthinking self-indulgence that is the only standard the moral relativist can erect as the standard of action.

The moral relativist stupid enough to say that moral standards are relative to the culture one was raised in, or even relative to the culture one adopts, either must expel himself from the Western world, burning churches, flags, libraries, schools and courthouses, and every other institution, or must stand self-condemned, his actions proving his words a lie.

Our culture is absolutist, and condemn moral relativism in no uncertain terms. In religion, Christendom has always held God to be the arbiter of right. In Politics, Americans have always held certain truths to be self-evident. In mathematics and physics, the West has always held natural reality to be the final arbiter of disputes. In law, Anglo-American law has always held precedent and written statute to be objective and final.

I must also mention that all cultures are absolutist. Despite popular errors to the contrary, the cultures of the East shaped by the teachings, in the Far East, of Confucius and Buddha, and in the Near East, of Mohammed, are also based on absolute moral or legal principles or both. Buddha does not offer the Four Noble Suggestions and the Eightfold Yet Optional Path, nor does the Prophet recite the five pillars of Islam as being merely the Nonbinding Suggestions of Allah.

The only place moral relativism is found is in the counterculture, and then only used as a defensive manoeuvre in argument and debate: no one lives this way and no one thinks anyone can live this way. It is merely a rationalization, a way of silencing criticism, that is only applied to certain principles the relativist wants to break. All other principles he accepts, relies on, and defends.

Perhaps my experience is insufficient, but I have yet to meet someone calling himself a moral relativist who spoke and acted as if murder, rape, robbery, theft, fraud, insensitivity, discourtesy, political incorrectness, judgmentalism, fundamentalism, lynching blacks, shooting abortionists, beating homosexuals, discriminating against Jews and Irishmen, electrocuting murderers, spanking children, segregating the races, allowing gun-ownership among the hoi polloi, or voting for Sarah Palin were not evil and abhorrent under all imaginable circumstances, unconditionally and absolutely.






 



(41 comments) - (Post a new comment)

The anarchist tyrant
[info]kgbman
2009-07-02 10:49 pm UTC (link)
The liberal believes that the satisfaction of desires is the sine qua non of public life. But as you said, if we are merely creatures of appetite and there is nothing that transcends the will of the self-created superman, there is no coherent way of resolving conflicts between them. Such a worldview is incoherent and antihuman, which is why the liberal has to make the unprincipled exception to keep it from self-destructing.

(Reply to this) (Thread)

Re: The anarchist tyrant
[info]mentalguy
2009-07-03 08:00 pm UTC (link)
Surely you can criticise such a worldview without resorting to epithets like "the liberal". It is one thing to label ideas (which we must do if we are to know what we are talking about); but it is another thing to go labeling categories of people to form a stereotype.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: The anarchist tyrant
[info]kgbman
2009-07-04 05:11 pm UTC (link)
I'm not using it as an epithet - I'm simply describing what liberals, in fact, believe. I'm an essentialist so I'm less interested in what people say they are than in what they actually are. If someone displays loyalty to, belief in, or otherwise assumes the tenets of liberalism, then he is, in fact, a liberal regardless of what he himself may think of the matter.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: The anarchist tyrant
[info]mentalguy
2009-07-04 06:46 pm UTC (link)

Rigid essentialism can be perilous when it comes to people; it is very easy to lose sight of charity. I bring this up because the particular category "liberal" is very frequently abused in that regard; moreover, the use of personal categories in this case is unnecessary and somewhat obscures your argument.


(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: The anarchist tyrant
[info]dirigibletrance
2009-07-05 05:44 am UTC (link)
John throws the word "liberal" or "the left" around way too much. To the point that they have lost alot of their impact or meaning. According to him almost everyone I know is a Leftist or Liberal (including, apparently, myself) despite the fact that if you put these people into a room together they would agree on almost anothing and not a few of them would make uncompromising moral stands against the other side of the room.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: The anarchist tyrant
[info]mentalguy
2009-07-05 07:42 pm UTC (link)
It is a habit of thought among many (modern) self-identified conservatives to use the word "liberal" in that fashion which Ayn Rand would term a "floating abstraction". That habit isn't intrinsic to conservatism though, so I am optimistic that John can eventually overcome it, particularly as he works so hard at being rigorous.

(And, of course, if you exchange the word "liberal" for others you'll find that the habit is hardly limited to conservatives of any variety. This sort of bad intellectual habit permeates contemporary political discourse.)

(Reply to this) (Parent)

Re: The anarchist tyrant
[info]mentalguy
2009-07-05 11:39 pm UTC (link)
To John's credit, you'll notice that, at least in in the original post above, he confines himself to terms like "moral relativist" which are objective and rigorously defined. Part of the reason I reacted to [info]kgbman's reply the way I did was because of the contrast.

(Reply to this) (Parent)

Re: The anarchist tyrant
[info]johncwright
2009-07-08 04:38 pm UTC (link)
"John throws the word "liberal" or "the left" around way too much. To the point that they have lost alot of their impact or meaning...."

I have found from sad experience that qualifying my statements to remind the reader that a few exceptions exist to every general comment is counterproductive.

Outside of the context of insincere debate, everyone recalls this principle in any case. Outside of the context of an insincere debate, no one regards it as telling to discover an exception to a general comment. If I say 'birds fly' only an insincere debater will reply, 'Aha! But penguins and ostriches are birds!'

The exceptions are unimportant. Leftism is a coherent world-view founded on certain principles, and while it is true that various specific Leftists may vary, to one degree or another, with the core principles, this does not mean the core principles (a) do not exist or (b) are not prevalent, even the majority view.

I have met a far Leftist who, while orthodox in all other ways, was a supporter of the Second Amendment. I have met an even farther Leftist who, while ultra-orthodox in most other ways, was a fervid and practicing Christian, and a hater of abortion.

To be clear, what I discovered was that qualifying my statements to remind the reader of the obvious fact that exceptions exist, did not obviate the objection that my statements were too broad, which is an objection that can be raised at any time, to any statement, no matter how narrow or carefully constructed.

And, by the way, where in the world did you get the idea that I was speaking of Leftists in the above essay? I spoke only of moral relativists and cultural moral relativists -- and I was quoting a Libertarian. If you are the one equating Leftist with moral relativists, then you are doing the same type of over-broad thinking of which you accuse me.

Except, in this case, we both know that the prevailing cultural myth of the Left does indeed embrace moral relativism, even if a few lonely exceptions exist.

(Reply to this) (Parent)


[info]juliet_winters
2009-07-02 11:36 pm UTC (link)
As to the tenth point, the adorers are endangering the objects of their affection with their worship, both spiritually and often ultimately physically.

I reserve my deepest admiration for actors who both portray intriguing characters and are capable of having relatively normal personal lives. I am pleased that they are able to both entertain their audiences and not go mad with adulation--that their private lives give them rich joy.

(Reply to this)


[info]randallsquared
2009-07-03 01:25 am UTC (link)
There is no way to reason to a highest goal (call it G). Any arguments you based your argument on would have to reference a goal that was the reason *why* you should desire G, but we've already postulated that G is the highest goal. Because G is the will of the gods? Why should we care what the will of the gods is? Because G is what evolution designed us to do? Why does that matter to an individual? Because we won't survive without it? What is *survival* important for?

One compromise that I have much sympathy with is, "Well, we can't see how to justify a highest goal (and therefore to base morals on anything), but it's possible that someone will be able to (even if that 'someone' is much more intelligent than we), and given the possibility, we should try to survive and thrive, since that will increase the chances that someone in the future will figure this out, and we're unlikely to fulfill our highest goal if we don't know what it is, or die out."

But humans may not even be able to have a single "highest goal", in a practical sense; we mostly have lots of goals that sometimes support and sometimes conflict with each other.

As to that last, I think you haven't met enough moral relativists. :)

(Reply to this) (Thread)


[info]docrampage
2009-07-03 02:30 am UTC (link)
Randall, you seem to be conflating the two issues of _reasoning_ to a highest goal and _justifying_ a highest goal. There is no logical difficulty in reasoning to a highest goal assuming you start with proper definitions and axioms. I assume that what you are getting at is that you can't logically derive any conclusions at all about value or goodness unless you start with axioms that are already about value or goodness. And then how do you justify the axioms? They can't be logically inferred because by definition they are accepted without inference. But this is an ancient problem in logic, and it extends to all areas of reasoning, not just in reasoning about value or goodness.

It is astonishing, in our day of universal education, how many people are so blissfully unaware of this --so much so as to harbor the conceit that all of their own beliefs are logically founded on obvious first principles. If all truth could be derived logically from obvious first principles, then there would be no need for disputes except with the ignorant and the insane (which is why, I suppose, that so many people who think their own beliefs are logically founded on obvious first principles think that anyone who disagrees with them is ignorant or insane).

I have probed the logic of some such people in the past and in all cases found that (1) they couldn't even begin to give me a list of their first principles and (2) they had no capacity for logical argumentation (or even knew what logic is). Their confidence in their own logic was nothing more than the supreme courage of complete ignorance.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)


[info]marycatelli
2009-07-03 03:00 am UTC (link)

which is why, I suppose, that so many people who think their own beliefs are logically founded on obvious first principles think that anyone who disagrees with them is ignorant or insane


Very little experience with them makes that an obvious conclusion. 0:)

(Reply to this) (Parent)

First Principles
[info]robertjwizard
2009-07-03 12:03 pm UTC (link)
"It is astonishing, in our day of universal education, how many people are so blissfully unaware of this --so much so as to harbor the conceit that all of their own beliefs are logically founded on obvious first principles."

I'd go one step further. Each and every one of their beliefs is a first principle in their mind. Each belief is like a metaphysical categorical imperative on its own island floating in a universe of similar such islands all unconnected to each other, and unconnected to anything prior.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: First Principles
[info]marycatelli
2009-07-03 03:40 pm UTC (link)
Was once attempting to discuss sex with a person who maintained that there was no such thing as immorality in the sexual realm as long as it was consensual.

I pointed out that children can, in fact, consent to sexual intercourse, and that a husband could infect his innocent wife with an STD.

He produced a new rule (in defiance of observable facts) that neither children nor married people can't consent. He openly admitted that he was pulling it out of a hat like a rabbit, and tried to argue that an ad hoc collection of principles according to what you wanted was superior to actually having a coherent scheme of things.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: First Principles
[info]dirigibletrance
2009-07-05 07:13 pm UTC (link)
Superior for him, since he only cares about his own wants.

Not superior for the rest of us. Selfishness is at the root of alot of these problems we are discussing.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: First Principles
[info]marycatelli
2009-07-05 09:34 pm UTC (link)
Not even superior for him. That he wants to sacrifice a greater good for a lesser one doesn't make it good for him.

(Reply to this) (Parent)

Re: First Principles
[info]docrampage
2009-07-03 07:23 pm UTC (link)
Robert, that is a very insightful observation. It explains why they are so sure of the basis of their beliefs and yet so unable to account for them. When they talk to people of like beliefs, everyone agrees that all of their beliefs are obvious first principles. But when a challenger causes them to actually engage in a bit of introspection on a given belief, they then realize that it can't be a first principle and so they are confused because they cannot reconcile the two facts that they are profoundly sure of their own rationality and at the same time profoundly bereft of rationality.

This is somewhat ironic because all of these beliefs have no source other than emotion and authority, yet they accuse Christians of relying too much on emotion and authority. I guess what they mean is that Christians should rely less on the authority of men that we believe to have been in close contact with God and more on the authority of their own prophets --entertainment figures.

(Reply to this) (Parent)

Re: First Principles
[info]ilion7
2009-07-07 12:01 pm UTC (link)
I think that's a good observation.

(Reply to this) (Parent)


[info]robert_mitchell
2009-07-03 03:12 am UTC (link)
I haven't met any. I don't think they exist. I thought I had met one, until someone broke into his car and he was angry for a week. I started noticing that none of the "moral relativists" were accepting when other people "wronged" them. Moral relativists can't even give the indifference they demand of others, really sad when you think of it, since a honest moral relativist can happily work within any moral code. They don't care, right?

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Honest Moral Relativist
[info]robertjwizard
2009-07-03 10:07 am UTC (link)
This goes to the whole crux of the relative moral viewpoint. By leaving out the light of reason and its mediating role in the appetites, any and all values, desires, choices are equally groundless to him. He does not question where such things come from and for him the experience of a desire has the unquestioned presence of an axiom. Which to him, they are.

I don't even think it's even a question of honesty. His starting point and standard is the desire. If so, how do you argue against one that has opposing desires, or an opposing view? They must be wrong. Why? They simply must be. His own psychological experience of his philosophy makes it impossible to follow that philosophy in regards to other people.

His common language isn't one of reason, of argument, of universal precepts and concepts, that allow us to mediate differing appetites, desires, goals, and values amongst our fellow man, but of the whim - his whim. Therefore, at the first sight of conflict, the first thing he has to abandon is his moral relativism and become an absolutist. Not a moral absolutist, but a whim absolutist, the primacy of his own desires and appetites over those of all other men.

(Reply to this) (Parent)


[info]johncwright
2009-07-08 04:42 pm UTC (link)
"There is no way to reason to a highest goal (call it G). "

Nonsense. All humans stand inside of a context of moral reasoning; we all are already provided with desires, appetites, passions, and a conscience. It is impossible to step outside that context and to attempt, as if on a blank slate, to reason oneself to any conclusion about proper moral reasoning, true: but from within the context of moral reasoning, not only is it possible, but, frequently, sages of all ages come to the same or very similar conclusions.

Your reasoning seems to be that if a line of reasoning has an axiom, it is illegitimate.

My reasoning, which you do not address, is that one cannot take one's mere raw desires and feelings as one's axioms of moral reasoning, for the ten reasons I give above. They are inadequate to the task.

(Reply to this) (Parent)


[info]simonbob
2009-07-03 01:50 pm UTC (link)
To be fair, a true counter-culturalist will apply their opposing arguments to all principles, including those of the counterculture. I'm reminded of Groucho Marx ("these are my principles; if you don't like them, I have others") but also of a South Park episode where a goth, having heard his peers argue against joining a dance troupe because it would be "conformist," decides to join after all so as not to conform with them.

Also: I usually place a separation between "feeling" and "instinct." My sense that I'd like to eat when I'm hungry is the former; the drive to eat if I were starving to death would be the latter. But society places its own definitions on these terms as well: the action movie star who dodges a sucker-punch from the shadows is said to have "good instincts" when he actually posesses well-honed reflexes. I suspect some sort of dictionary mix-up was the source of the initial confusion. (Of course, knowing me, I'm probably wrong too, but at least my assumption here would've precluded any arguing that feelings had to be followed.)

(Reply to this) (Thread)


[info]marycatelli
2009-07-03 06:11 pm UTC (link)
Trying not to conform is a fool's game. Even more than other attempts to not do something, because of the fun and games in

But like them, its requirements are purely negative, and you can't just do nothing.

The only way is to distract yourself. Decide what you want to do, and pursue that. And if you find yourself wondering about whether you are conforming, pull your thoughts away to your new ideal and wonder whether, say, you are acting in a saintly manner.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)


[info]mentalguy
2009-07-03 07:52 pm UTC (link)

And if you find yourself wondering about whether you are conforming, pull your thoughts away to your new ideal and wonder whether, say, you are acting in a saintly manner.

In other words, pick something better to conform to. :)

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)


[info]marycatelli
2009-07-03 08:43 pm UTC (link)
good point there -- you can not just conform, you have to conform to some object.

so you're bound to be conforming to something

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)


[info]m_francis
2009-07-03 09:06 pm UTC (link)
Perhaps part of the problem is the elevation of relations to the status of entities. Conformity, a bad entity. Consent, a good entity. Diversity, another good entity. But all these things are relations of the mind to an object, and it matters what the object is. Conformity to something. COnsent to something. Diversity in or of something. Without the object, the relation is without meaning and confusion always results when the real world of particulars is encountered.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)


[info]marycatelli
2009-07-04 02:56 am UTC (link)
Subversion, a good thing.

Indeed, you run across silliness like "subversive literature" when, of course, all literature subverts something. It may subvert civilization, it may subvert revolution, but it will subvert something.

(Reply to this) (Parent)


[info]mentalguy
2009-07-04 06:48 pm UTC (link)
To this list I would add "faith" and "hope". Faith in someone. Hope for something.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)


[info]marycatelli
2009-07-05 09:26 pm UTC (link)
Or Hope And Change? 0:)

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Change
[info]krokinole
2009-07-05 10:18 pm UTC (link)
Driving around the other week, I saw a bumper-sticker that I found completely unnerving - "Yes We Did." It seemed to imply that since Mr. O was elected, History Was Changed and everything is all better now. No need for him to actually do anything. As long as there is Change, as long as things are different now than they were, they must be improving, right? The complete lack of though and understanding that sticker betrayed makes me fear that our civilization may already have passed the point of no return.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: Change
[info]mentalguy
2009-07-06 12:02 am UTC (link)
It is either that, or satire. I could see different people getting that sticker for different reasons.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: Change
[info]krokinole
2009-07-06 09:35 pm UTC (link)
Oh, I hadn't thought of that. Here's hoping.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: Change
[info]marycatelli
2009-07-07 02:13 pm UTC (link)
And you have changed from despair to hopefulness!

0:)

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: Change
[info]krokinole
2009-07-07 04:13 pm UTC (link)
Ouch.

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)

Re: Change
[info]marycatelli
2009-07-07 06:45 pm UTC (link)
giggles

Who, me? 0:)

(Reply to this) (Parent)

Re: Change
[info]marycatelli
2009-07-06 02:12 pm UTC (link)
Before the car didn't sport that bumper sticker. Now it does.

Change!

(Reply to this) (Parent)


[info]mentalguy
2009-07-05 11:59 pm UTC (link)
You've got it. :)

(Reply to this) (Parent)


[info]simonbob
2009-07-04 08:10 pm UTC (link)
To be honest, I'm kinda conflicted about acting saintly... my middle name is Sebastian, and those arrows look awfully pointy. ;)

(Reply to this) (Parent)(Thread)


[info]marycatelli
2009-07-04 09:57 pm UTC (link)
But where's the challenge if there's no conflict? 0:)

(Reply to this) (Parent)


[info]lotdw
2009-07-03 11:47 pm UTC (link)
Oh, what have I wrought. That sounds really self-aggrandizing, now that I think about it.

His really, really underlying problem, far as I could tell, wasn't even that he regarded feelings as a given. It's that he didn't seem to believe in final cause. It's a pretty serious problem that makes discussion with certain types of atheists and all relativists basically impossible. The most they can do is recite tautologies - this is what is. Then they follow it with "and that's all that is and all that matters," which isn't exactly a tautology, but it's considered on the same level. He never responded to my second post, though, which is probably a good thing for my sanity. Long discussions on these topics generally go nowhere and eat up my thought processes for weeks as I try to work through all the contradictions.

(Reply to this) (Thread)


[info]johncwright
2009-07-08 04:47 pm UTC (link)
"It's that he didn't seem to believe in final cause."

The problem, of course, is that whether he knows he believes in final causes or not, final cause is an inescapable category of human thought. He has unspoken, perhaps inarticulate, conclusions which flow from whatever unexamined axiom he entertains about final causes, but absent a proper education, be cannot bring that axiom out into the sunlight of Socratic questioning and examine it to see if it is sound.

Much patience is required, and honest good will on both sides.

(Reply to this) (Parent)


(41 comments) - (Post a new comment)

Create an Account
Forgot your login or password?
Login w/ OpenID
English • Español • Deutsch • Русский…